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BIO
Rob Lovering is Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York - College of Staten Island. He is the author of A Moral Defense of Prostitution (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), A Moral Defense of Recreational Drug Use (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), God and Evidence: Problems for Theistic Philosophers (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), and numerous articles on topics in ethics and the philosophy of religion. He lives in New York City.
BOOKS
A MORAL DEFENSE OF PROSTITUTION
2021
Is prostitution immoral? In this book, Rob Lovering argues that it is not. Offering a careful and thorough critique of the many―twenty, to be exact―arguments for prostitution's immorality, Lovering leaves no claim unchallenged. Drawing on the relevant literature along with his own creative thinking, Lovering offers a clear and reasoned moral defense of the world's oldest profession. Lovering demonstrates convincingly, on both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist grounds, that there is nothing immoral about prostitution between consenting adults. The legal implications of this view are also brought to bear on the current discourse surrounding this controversial topic.
A MORAL DEFENSE OF RECREATIONAL DRUG USE
2015
Why does American law allow the recreational use of some drugs, such as alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine, but not others, such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin? The answer lies not simply in the harm the use of these drugs might cause, but in the perceived morality—or lack thereof—of their recreational use. Despite strong rhetoric from moral critics of recreational drug use, however, it is surprisingly difficult to discern the reasons they have for deeming the recreational use of (some) drugs morally wrong. In this book, Rob Lovering lays out and dissects various arguments for the immorality of using marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and other drugs recreationally. He contends that, by and large, these arguments do not succeed. Lovering's book represents one of the first works to systematically present, analyze, and critique arguments for the moral wrongness of recreational drug use. Given this, as well as the popularity of the morality-based defense of the United States' drug laws, this book is an important and timely contribution to the debate on the recreational use of drugs.
GOD AND EVIDENCE: PROBLEMS FOR THEISTIC PHILOSOPHERS
2013
God and Evidence presents a new set of compelling problems for theistic philosophers. The problems pertain to three types of theistic philosopher, which Lovering defines here as 'theistic inferentialists,' 'theistic non-inferentialists,' and 'theistic fideists.' Theistic inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle but in practice. Theistic non-inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is non-inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle but in practice. Theistic fideists believe that God exists, that there is no discoverable probabilifying evidence (inferential or non-inferential) of God's existence, and that it is nevertheless acceptable-morally if not otherwise-to have faith that God exists. Lovering argues that each type of theistic philosopher faces a problem unique to his type and that they all share two particular problems. Some of these problems take us down an entirely new discursive path; others down a new discursive path branching off from an old one.
ARTICLES
ALL HUMAN BEINGS ARE EQUAL, BUT SOME HUMAN BEINGS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: A CASE STUDY ON PUNISHING ABORTION-PERFORMING DOCTORS BUT NOT ABORTION-PROCURING WOMEN
In this paper, I present a case study on a recent attempt at implementing what I refer to as the “Pro-lifer’s Asymmetrical Punishment View” (PAPV), the view that people should be legally punished for performing abortions whereas women should not be so punished for procuring abortions. While doing so, I argue that the endeavor, which took place in the state of Alabama, is incoherent relative to the conjunction of its purported underlying moral rationale and the Alabama criminal code. I then present what I take to be possible explanations for, practical implications of, and solutions to the attempt and its incoherence. Given that other endeavors to implement PAPV are currently in the works and are so with similar underlying moral rationales and within similar criminal codes, what I present and argue here is not limited to Alabama’s attempt at doing so.
A MORAL ARGUMENT FOR FROZEN HUMAN EMBRYO ADOPTION
Some people (e.g., Drs. Paul and Susan Lim) and, with them, organizations (e.g., the National Embryo Donation Center) believe that, morally speaking, the death of a frozen human embryo is a very bad thing. With such people and organizations in mind, the question to be addressed here is as follows: if one believes that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, ought, morally speaking, one prevent the death of at least one frozen embryo via embryo adoption? By way of a three‐premise argument, one of which is a moral principle first introduced by Peter Singer, my answer to this question is: at least some of those who believe this ought to. (Just who the “some” are is identified in the paper.) If this is correct, then, for said people, preventing the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is not a morally neutral matter; it is, instead, a morally laden one. Specifically, their intentional refusal to prevent the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is, at a minimum, morally criticizable and, arguably, morally forbidden. Either way, it is, to one extent or another, a moral failing.
AN ARGUMENT FOR THE PRIMA FACIE WRONGNESS OF HAVING PROPOSITIONAL FAITH
W. K. Clifford famously argued that it is “wrong always, everywhere and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” Though the spirit of this claim resonates with me, the letter does not. To wit, I am inclined to think that it is not morally wrong for, say, an elderly woman on her death bed to believe privately that she is going to heaven even if she does so on insufficient evidence—indeed, and lest there be any confusion, even if the woman herself deems the evidence for her so believing to be insufficient. After all, her believing so does not appear to endanger, harm, or violate the rights of anyone, nor does it make the world a worse place in a significant, if any, way. That Clifford might have put too fine a point on the matter, however, does not entail that there are no conditions under which it is wrong to believe something upon insufficient evidence. In this paper, I argue that, in cases where believing a proposition (read: believing a proposition to be true) will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to have propositional faith—for present purposes, to believe the proposition despite deeming the evidence for one’s believing to be insufficient—before one has attempted to believe the proposition by proportioning one’s belief to the evidence.
“THAT’S JUST SO-AND-SO BEING SO-AND-SO": ON POSSIBLE MEANINGS, FUNCTIONS, AND MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXPLANATION
When it comes to explaining someone’s puzzling, objectionable, or otherwise problematic behavior, one type of explanation occasionally employed in the service of doing so is as follows: “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so.” But what, exactly, do explanations of the type “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so” mean? More specifically, in what way, if any, is it meaningful or informative to say such things? And what is the precise function of such explanations of someone’s behavior? Is it merely to present what one takes to be the underlying causes of the behavior, or something beyond that? In what follows, I lay out a few possibilities—basic possibilities, to be precise, given philosophy’s keen interest in fundamentals—with respect to the various meanings, functions, and moral implications of explanations of the type “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so.” While doing so, I apply these basic possibilities to three tokens of this kind of explanation: “That’s just Manny being Manny” (in reference to Manny Ramirez, the former professional baseball player), “That’s just Charlie being Charlie” (in reference to Charlie Rose, the former television host), and “That’s just Trump being Trump” (in reference to Donald Trump, the current President of the United States).
THREE ERRORS IN THE SUBSTANCE VIEW’S DEFENSE
According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing known as the “substance view,” all human beings have intrinsic value, full moral standing and, with these, a right to life. The substance view has been defended by numerous contemporary philosophers who use the theory to argue that the standard human fetus has a right to life and, ultimately, that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong. In this paper, I identify three important errors committed by some of these philosophers in their defense of the theory---what I refer to as the “extratheoretical-proposition error,” “quantitative-differences error,” and “non-normative-answer error”---and conclude that these errors render their defense inadequate.
THE SUBSTANCE VIEW: A CRITIQUE (PART 3)
In my articles ‘The Substance View: A Critique’ and ‘The Substance View: A Critique,’ I raise objections to the substance view, a theory of intrinsic value and moral standing defended by a number of contemporary moral philosophers, including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Christopher Tollefsen, and Francis Beckwith. In part one of my critique of the substance view, I raise reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among other human beings. In part two, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of that conclusion. Here, in part three, I raise objections to Henrik Friberg-Fernros's attempt to rebut some of the aforementioned objections.
THE SUBSTANCE VIEW: A CRITIQUE (PART 2)
In my initial critique of the substance view, I raised reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among others. In this follow-up critique, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of this conclusion. I begin by briefly presenting the substance view as well as its defense. (For a more thorough presentation, see the first part of my critique.) I then raise objections to three claims involved in the substance view's defense: the claim that the standard human fetus's intrinsic value and moral standing is a function of its potentiality; the claim that the standard human fetus's intrinsic value and moral standing is a function of its essential properties; and the claim that it is the possession of the basic potential for rational moral agency that best accounts for the wrongness of killing the standard human fetus, among others.
THE SUBSTANCE VIEW: A CRITIQUE
According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the ‘substance view,’ what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency – a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human fetuses have the same intrinsic value and moral standing as adult human beings. After giving consideration to defenders of the substance view's replies to these charges, I then critique each of them, ultimately concluding that none is successful. Of course, in order to understand all of these things – the reductio charges, defenders of the substance view's replies to them, and my criticisms of their replies – one must have a better understanding of the substance view as well as its defense. Accordingly, I address the substance view's understanding of rational moral agency as well as present its defense.
DOES GOD KNOW WHAT IT’S LIKE NOT TO KNOW?
The topic of divine omniscience is well-trodden ground, with philosophers and theologians having asked virtually every question there is to ask about it. The questions regarding God's omniscience to be addressed here are as follows. First, is omniscience best understood as maximal propositional knowledge along with maximal experiential knowledge? I argue that it is. Second, is it possible for God to be essentially omniscient? I argue that it is not.
ON THE MORALITY OF HAVING FAITH THAT GOD EXISTS
Many theists who identify themselves with the Abrahamic religions maintain that it is perfectly acceptable to have faith that God exists. In this paper, I argue that, when believing that God exists will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to forgo attempting to believe that God exists on the basis of sufficient evidence. Lest there be any confusion : I do not argue that it is always wrong to have faith that God exists, only that, under certain conditions, it can be.
DOES ORDINARY MORALITY IMPLY ATHEISM? A REPLY TO MAITZEN
Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that ordinary morality implies atheism. In the following, I argue that the soundness of Maitzen’s argument depends on a principle that is implausible, what I call the Recipient’s Benefit Principle: All else being equal, if an act A produces a net benefit for the individual on the receiving end of A, then one cannot have a moral obligation to prevent A. Specifically, the Recipient’s Benefit Principle (RBP) must be true if premise (2) of Maitzen’s argument is to be true. But, RBP is likely false, as it generates counterintuitive implications as well as conflicts with another principle both plausible and seemingly adopted by most of us, what I call the Preventing Immorality Principle: All else being equal, if an act A is seriously immoral, then one has a moral obligation to prevent A.
THE EVER CONSCIOUS VIEW: A CRITIQUE
Elizabeth Harman has recently proposed a new theory of moral status, the Ever Conscious View. It is the view that "a being has moral status at a time just in case it is alive at that time and there is a time in its life at which it is conscious" (Harman, 2007, 220). In other words, all and only beings that (1) are alive and (2) either were, are, or will be conscious have moral status. In the following, I examine Harman's defense of her Ever Conscious View, raise a number of objections to it, and conclude that the Ever Conscious View is, as it stands, implausible.
THE PROBLEM OF THE THEISTIC EVIDENTIALIST PHILOSOPHERS
That theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make the evidential case for theism to atheistic evidentialist philosophers raises a problem—a question to be answered. I argue here that—of the most plausible possible solutions to this problem—each is either inadequate or, when adequate, in conflict with the theistic evidentialist philosophers’ defining beliefs. I conclude that the problem of the theistic evidentialist philosophers—the question of why theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make their case to atheistic evidentialist philosophers—is a problem for theistic evidentialist philosophers—an objection to their defining beliefs.
FUTURES OF VALUE AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HUMAN EMBRYOS
Many people are strongly opposed to the intentional destruction of human embryos, whether it be for purposes scientific, reproductive, or other. And it is not uncommon for such people to argue against the destruction of human embryos by invoking the claim that the destruction of human embryos is morally on par with killing the following humans: (A) the standard infant, (B) the suicidal teenager, (C) the temporarily comatose individual, and (D) the standard adult. I argue here that this claim is false and do so as follows. First, I provide an account of the prima facie wrongness of killing individuals (A) – (D). Briefly, I contend that individuals (A) – (D) have a certain property in common, that of having a future of value. An individual who has a future of value has the potential to (i) value goods of consciousness when he will (or would) experience them and (ii) do so as a psychologically continuous individual. And depriving an individual of a future of value is prima facie wrong. Killing an individual deprives him of a future of value. Thus, killing an individual who has a future of value is prima facie wrong. Since individuals (A) – (D) have futures of value, killing them is prima facie wrong. Second, I argue that, given this account of the prima facie wrongness of killing individuals (A) – (D), the destruction of individual (E), the standard embryo, is not morally on par with killing individuals (A) – (D). For, unlike individuals (A) – (D), the standard embryo does not have a future of value. Specifically, I argue that having a future of value involves having the second-order potential for psychological continuity, a potential that individuals (A) – (D) have but that individual (E) does not. For possessing the second-order potential for psychological continuity requires the possession of psychological states, something individuals (A) – (D) have but that individual (E) lacks. Hence, individual (E) does not share with individuals (A) – (D) the property of having a future of value and, in turn, is not deprived of one when it is killed. Thus, given my proposed account of the prima facie wrongness of killing individuals (A) – (D), killing individual (E) is not morally on par with killing individuals (A) – (D).
ON WHAT GOD WOULD DO
Many debates in the philosophy of religion, particularly arguments for and against the existence of God, depend on a claim or set of claims about what God—qua sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being— would do , either directly or indirectly, in particular cases or in general. Accordingly, before these debates can be resolved we must first settle the more fundamental issue of whether we can know, or at least have justified belief about, what God would do. In this paper, I lay out the possible positions on the issue of whether we can know what God would do, positions I refer to as Broad Skeptical Theism, Broad Epistemic Theism, and Narrow Skeptical Theism. I then examine the implications of each of these views and argue that each presents serious problems for theism.
THE VIRTUES OF HUNTING: A REPLY TO JENSEN
In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) fails to provide sufficient justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals. In order to do this, I examine an EVE justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals and argue that it gives rise to the following dilemma: either EVE justifies the hunting of both human and nonhuman animals, or it justifies the hunting of neither. I then submit that the first lemma ought to be rejected as absurd and, thus, that the second lemma ought to be embraced.
DOES A NORMAL FETUS REALLY HAVE A FUTURE OF VALUE? A REPLY TO MARQUIS
The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the fetus is a person, whether the fetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate “requires a different strategy.” Hence his “future of value” strategy, which is summarized as follows: (1) A normal fetus has a future of value. (2) Depriving a normal fetus of a future of value imposes a misfortune on it. (3) Imposing a misfortune on a normal fetus is prima facie wrong. (4) Therefore, depriving a normal fetus of a future of value is prima facie wrong. (5) Killing a normal fetus deprives it of a future of value. (6) Therefore, killing a normal fetus is prima facie wrong. In this paper, I argue that Marquis’s strategy is not different since it involves the concept of person—a concept deeply rooted in the traditional approach. Specifically, I argue that futures are valuable insofar as they are not only dominated by goods of consciousness, but are experienced by psychologically continuous persons. Moreover, I argue that his strategy is not sound since premise (1) is false. Specifically, I argue that a normal fetus, at least during the first trimester, is not a person. Thus, during that stage of development it is not capable of experiencing its future as a psychologically continuous person and, hence, it does not have a future of value.
MARY ANNE WARREN ON ‘FULL’ MORAL STATUS
In the contemporary debate on moral status, it is not uncommon to find philosophers who embrace the the Principle of Full Moral Status, according to which the degree to which an entity E possesses moral status is proportional to the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties until a threshold degree of morally relevant properties possession is reached, whereupon the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties may continue to increase, but the degree to which E possesses moral status remains the same. One philosopher who has contributed significantly to the contemporary debate on moral status and embraces the Principle of Full Moral Status is Mary Anne Warren. Warren holds not only that it is possible for some entities to possess full moral status, but that some entities actually do, e.g., normal adult human beings. I argue that two of Warren’s primary arguments for the Principle of Full Moral Status—the Argument from Pragmatism and the Argument from Explanatory Power—are significantly flawed.
DIVINE HIDDENNESS AND INCULPABLE IGNORANCE
J. L. Schellenberg claims that the weakness of evidence for God’s existence is not merely a sign that God is hidden, “it is a revelation that God does not exist.” In Divine Hiddenness : New Essays, Michael J. Murray provides a “soul-making” defense of God’s hiddenness, arguing that if God were not hidden, then some of us would lose what many theists deem a good thing: the ability to develop morally significant characters. In this paper, I argue that Murray’s soul-making defense not only fails to defend God’s hiddenness, it produces an argument for the nonexistence of God.
PROSTITUTION & INSTRUMENTALIZATION
Is prostitution immoral? Various philosophers have put forward arguments for thinking so, one of the most notable being that, by engaging in sexual activity with someone for payment, the prostitute instrumentalizes himself or herself. In this paper, I identify two meanings of "instrumentalize" and, with them, two versions of the instrumentalization argument for the immorality of prostitution. I then critique each version of the argument.
ON MORAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST RECREATIONAL DRUG USE
There is a wide array of arguments for the immorality of recreational drug use, ranging from the philosophically rudimentary to the philosophically sophisticated. But the vast majority of these arguments are unsuccessful, and those that succeed are quite limited in scope. In this article, I present and evaluate a few examples of such arguments.
Philosophers on Drugs: Essays on the Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Ethics of Psychoactive Drug Use
I am seeking abstracts (consisting of no more than 300 words) for an edited volume of essays on the metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics of psychoactive (mind-altering) substance use. It is preferred that contributors address one or more of the following topics, but submissions on topics not explicitly mentioned here are welcome as well.
METAPHYSICS
Free Will
With which theory on free will does the phenomenon of drug-induced mind-altering experiences and their impact on behavior comport best? Skepticism? Compatibilism? Libertarianism?
Can mind-altering drug use ever be performed freely?
What distinguishes cases of mind-altering drug use that negate one’s free will from cases of mind-altering drug use that do not negate one’s free will?
To what extent, if any, does drug addiction pose a special challenge to free will?
To what extent, if any, can the use of mind-altering drugs expand one’s capacity for exercising free will?
From the compatibilist perspective, what is it about mind-altering drugs’ impact on one’s minds that poses a special threat to free will that we don’t find with other possible deterministic causes of one’s behavior?
Personal Identity
With which account of personal identity does the phenomenon of drug-induced mind-altering experiences comport best? The bodily account? The psychological account? The soul account? The embodied-mind account? Some other account?
Is it possible to destroy personal identity through one or more drug-induced mind-altering experiences? If so, how likely is this and in what kinds of circumstances is this likely to occur?
Mind
What does the phenomenon of drug-induced mind-altering experiences tell us about the nature of the mind?
Does the fact that nonhuman animals appear to enjoy ingesting certain naturally occurring substances that cause mind-altering experiences suggest that our minds are naturally geared towards seeking the kinds of mind-altering experiences offered by some drugs?
In what ways are drug-induced mind-altering experiences different from those that are not drug induced (e.g., mind-altering experiences induced by amusement-park rides, athletic activities, the arts, etc.)? In what ways are they the same?
To what extent, if any, do drug-induced mind-altering experiences enhance one’s self-awareness? To what extent do they inhibit one’s self-awareness?
To what extent, if any, do drug-induced mind-altering experiences interfere with one’s agency?
Are drug-induced mind-altering experiences unnatural, metaphysically speaking, in any way?
What kind of mind is required in order to enjoy a drug-induced mind-altering experience?
Can one learn to enjoy a drug-induced mind-altering experience? Must one learn to enjoy certain drug-induced mind-altering experiences, if they are to be enjoyed at all?
EPISTEMOLOGY
Analysis of Knowledge
What, if anything, does the phenomenon of drug-induced mind-altering experiences tell us about the nature of knowledge? Of justification? Of belief? Of truth? Of warrant?
Knowledge Instantiation
What kinds of things, if any, can one know or be justified in believing while undergoing a drug-induced mind-altering experience? What kinds of things, if any, can’t one know or be justified in believing while doing so? Do the answers to these questions depend on the number or kind of drug-induced mind-altering experiences one has?
To what extent, if any, do drug-induced mind-altering experiences enhance self-understanding? To what extent do they inhibit self-understanding?
In what ways are drug-induced mind-altering experiences illusory? In what ways aren’t they illusory?
Which theory of justification most accurately represents how justification proceeds in the drug-induced altered mind? Foundationalism? Coherentism? Reliabilism? Some other theory?
Sources of Knowledge
Might a drug-induced mind-altering experience be required for certain kinds of knowledge? For certain objects of knowledge?
In what ways are the standard sources of knowledge (reason, the senses, etc.) enhanced by drug-induced mind-altering experiences? In what ways are they inhibited?
Might drug-induced mind-altering experiences be conducive, or even required, for (certain kinds of) religious knowledge?
ETHICS
Value
In what ways, if any, are drug-induced mind-altering experiences superior to mind-altering experiences that are not drug induced? In what ways are they inferior?
Is a life that includes some drug-induced mind-altering experiences better than a life that does not?
In what way, if any, is drug addiction bad? Can addiction to a drug ever be good?
What does the fact that drug-induced mind-altering experiences are desired by some people tell us about the desirability of existing in a Nozickian experience machine?
Morality
What is the moral status of pursuing or having a drug-induced mind-altering experience?
If one is addicted to a particular mind-altering drug, is one’s use of that drug thereby immoral?
When one uses a mind-altering drug for recreational purposes, does one thereby treat oneself as a mere means to an end? If so, is there anything wrong with that?
Is the mere risk of addiction sufficient to render the use of mind-altering drugs immoral?
Is the use of a mind-altering drug morally permissible when it has no non-negligible effects on others?
Assuming drug-induced mind-altering experiences are partly illusory in nature, is it wrong to pursue or have them?
If drug-induced mind-altering experiences are unnatural in one way or another, are they thereby immoral?
Is there anything wrong with enhancing an aesthetic experience via mind-altering drug use?
In what way, if any, is the use of drugs that serve as cognitive enhancers morally problematic? Could the use of drugs that serve as cognitive enhancers ever be morally obligatory?
Is it immoral to teach young adults how to use mind-altering drugs responsibly? Is it morally problematic not to teach them how to do so? What is “responsible” mind-altering drug use, anyway, and how likely is it? Is it even possible?
Legality
Should use of a mind-altering drug for recreational purposes be criminalized? Decriminalized? Legalized?
If criminalized, what should be the legal punishment for using a mind-altering drug for recreational purposes?
If decriminalized or legalized, how should the use of a mind-altering drug for recreational purposes be regulated?
CONTACT
Email: rob.lovering@csi.cuny.edu